‘AGNI-III’ missile, passes through the Rajpath during the 59th Republic Day Parade-2008, in New Delhi on January 26, 2008. Photo Credit: PIBJune 21, 2008 - I have received a fair amount of flak for my harsh comments on the adequacy of India's nuclear deterrent.
Sukhoi Fan, a blog reader, recently asked me to reconcile my views with the very well written and researched document on Bharak Rakshak
Since Sukhoi Fan did not just tell me just shut the [bleep] up, as most detractors of my view point tend to do, I wrote a response to his post this morning.
The response turned out a little longer than I intended and yet fleetingly touched the tip of the iceberg because the subject is as grim as ponderous.
However, here is my brief take on the document referred to above. I will readily elaborate my viewpoints if others join the discussion.
Incidentally, my views on the Tejas LCA, posted four years ago at, and heartily criticized by many on my blog and on Bharat Rakshak, have, regretfully, stood the test of time. Tejas is more in the dumps today than it was four years ago.
The Scientific Advisor to Defence Minister and Secretary, Defence R&D, Dr. M. Natarajan, (seventh from right), posing with DRDO Scientists and Engineers moments before the AGNI-3 Missile was successfully launched from Wheeler Island off Orissa Coast on May 07, 2008. The AGNI Program Director, Dr Avinash Chander (ninth from right), and the Deputy NSA, Shri Shekhar Dutt (eleventh from right) are also seen. Photo Credit: PIBI hate to say ‘I said so’ but I said so.
Anyway here is my response to Sukhoi Fan reposted here.
Sukhoi Fan,
Like everyone else deeply interested in the subject, I have gone through the document several times and continue to do so periodically.
It is not my intent to refute the information in the document but to put it in the correct perspective.
The documents basically states what the DRDO would like the country to hear, and is reminiscent of similar claims by organization on other critical defense projects such as LCA, Arjun MBT and ATV.
There exist serious doubts, based on recorded seismic signatures on May 11 and 13 in 1998, about the veracity of Indian claims that they tested 5 nuclear devices during Pokhran II. A discussion on the subject is beyond the scope of this post but a very informed and balanced discussion on the subject can be found from Page 500 onwards in Ashley Tellis' book 'India's Emerging Nuclear Posture. Tellis, as you probably know is an advisor on John McCain's team.
The two stage thermonuclear bomb, which appears to be the mainstay of India's credible nuclear deterrent, was either not fully tested (Indian claim) or failed (Seismological data) on May 11, 1998.
Even if all the tests were 100% successful as claimed by India, more tests need to be carried out to ensure adequate reliability of the warheads and the ability to control their yields.
The Agni missile has a crippling range / payload limitation, which precludes it from being considered a credible deterrent.
For our deterrent to be credible we should be able to mount a devastating counter value strike with thermonuclear bombs on large Chinese cities like Beijing. At least some of the warheads mounted on the missiles must be able to fly through an ABM shield defending the city.
I agree with a lot of experts on the subject that India does not have an adequately tested thermonuclear warhead, but even if we do the Agni 3 missiles range gets in the way.
Because of Agni 3's range limitation (3500 km), India is being forced to locate the missiles in the NE, an area of the country over which the government has a tenuous grip. The road / rail mobility of the missile not withstanding, the location of the missile in the area at any given point could be ascertained by the Chinese through ground intelligence.
A file photo of 'AGNI-III' missile, passing through the Rajpath during the Republic Day Parade, in New Delhi. Photo Credit: PIBIn order to ensure accuracy the missiles would need to be launched from surveyed designated sites, and those locations could also be ascertained.
The problem is compounded by the fact that our nuclear posture entails keeping the warheads and the missiles separate. The warhead storage facilities could be identified by the Chinese.
The limited geographical extent of the deployment area negates the mobility of the missiles.
After a very limited counter force nuclear strike on India, to humiliate the country, the Chinese could send their Su-27 bombers to strike all known missile locations with conventional bombs in the NE to ensure the Agni's don't take to the air.
The plan to extend the range of the missile by adding a miniaturized third-stage would limit the number of warheads that could be mounted and their ability to evade Chinese ABM defenses.
There is a lot more I could say…but I will stop by saying we need heavier missiles and more testing before we can claim to possess a credible nuclear deterrent. Incidentally, the phrase 'credible nuclear deterrent' is hardly being used, even by our leaders.
Very often well and accurately written documents replete with facts can obfuscate the real issues. The document that you refer to does precisely that.
Vijainder
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