Photo obtained from Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Introduction
The Topol M is the latest version of the Topol missile that carries the NATO designation of SS-25. A road mobile version of this missile is referred to as Topol M1. The naval version of the Topol M is called the Bulava.
A Topo M1 was successfully tested on November 1, 2005. The missile was launched from the Kapustin Yar test range in Astrakhan region and targeted at the 10th test range at Lake Balkhash (a.k.a. Priozersk) in Kazakhstan.
Photo obtained from Center for Nonproliferation Studies
A successful test of the Bulava was conducted on September 27.The missile was launched from the Dmitry Donskoy, a Typhoon class ballistic missile submarine towards a designated 'target' at the Kura test site on the Kamchatka Peninsula
Bulava Missile Test. Photo obtained from RIA Novosti
An Interfax report datelined Oct 25, 2005 quoted Strategic Missile Troops Commander Col. Gen. Nikolai Solovtsov as stating that Russian Strategic Missile Troops' will switchover to Topol-M land-based mobile missile starting early in 2006.
A Paradigm Shift
Russian officials, including President Putin, have repeatedly alluded to Topol M in the past few years as a weapon system that will correct the strategic imbalance that has inexorably crept in as Russia has struggled with its economic and political restructuring and the US has vigorously pursued Ballistic Missile Defense systems.
For example, in an AFP story datelined Nov 17, 2004 President Putin reportedly told an annual meeting of high-level Russian military officers
"We have not only conducted tests of the latest nuclear rocket systems, I am sure that in the coming years we will acquire them."
"Moreover, these will be things which do not exist and are unlikely to exist in other nuclear powers," Putin added.
From the tenor of the remarks made at the highest level it is evident that the Russians regard the Topol M / Bulava missiles as special. As more facts have emerged on these weapon systems it is becoming increasingly evident that the Russian confidence in these weapon system is not misplaced.
More significant than the capabilities of the missile, which as we will see are formidable, is the shift in paradigm from quantity to quality in Russian weapon systems. Under this paradigm shift even as the number of Russian nuclear warheads drops their quality increases. Even as Russia does away with a large number of its rail mobile ICBMs it replaces them with a smaller number of harder to detect road mobile ICBMs.
Topol M
The Topol M missile weighs 47.2 tons and carries a warhead of 1,200 kilograms. Its range exceeds 10,000 kilometers. It is capable of carrying 10 MIRV warheads.
Tens years back, when Boost phase and Midcourse Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) systems were unheard of, the information above is all you would have cared to know. However, the above facts give you very little idea about the true strength of the Topol M - The fact that it is capable of evading all BMD systems - Boost Phase, Midcourse as well as Terminal.
Illustration obtained from Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Boost Phase Capability
Boost Phase missile defense systems rely on detecting and targeting a ballistic missile within seconds of its launch. During this phase the missile presents a large slow target that can easily be detected using space based infrared systems because of its hot exhaust plume and then attacked using an Airborne Laser System.
The US Air Force Space-Based Infrared System-High (SBIRS-High) system is expected to be in place by 2007. The system will consist of four primary satellites in Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO), two spacecraft carrying infrared sensors in Highly Elliptical Orbit (HEO), and a Mission Control Station (MCS) located on the ground.
SBIRS-High can provide targeting information on an ICBM to an Airborne Laser System within 10-20 seconds of its launch giving Airborne Laser System enough time to incinerate the missile electronics.
Infrared sensors in SBIRS-High use scanning and staring elements. In a typical combat scenario, the "scanning" sensors will detect a missile launch, and the "staring" sensors will lock on to the missile itself and transmit detailed data to the Mission Control Station.
A silo based missile can be stared at before launch since its location is known. Hence targeting information on the missile is available almost immediately. A road mobile missile like the Topol M can delay detection because it cannot be 'stared' at.
Additionally, the Topol M missile uses three engines during boost phase to allow it to accelerate much faster than conventional ICBMs. The missile is also reported to be hardened to withstand sustained illumination by the laser fielded on the Airborne Laser System.
An Airborne Laser System used for Boost Phase neutralization of ballistic missiles.
Mid Course Capability
A ballistic missile is most vulnerable to anti missile defenses during its mid course phase when it is follows a predictable ballistic trajectory. This also happens to be the longest phase of its flight to target.
The Topol M and Bulava missiles employ a maneuvering warhead called the Igla. This warhead was first tested in February 2004 with an older version of Topol. The trajectory of Igla is not just difficult but, in fact, impossible to predict because the warhead has auxiliary engines that switch on and off randomly. The targeting system of the warhead keeps track of changes in the trajectory on account of these random engine firings and eventually guides the warhead toward its target.
The Igla will reportedly also use IR counter measures and decoys to confuse any Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicles (Interceptors) that may target it during that phase. It may be noted that the interceptors planned to be deployed as part of the US GMD (Ground Based Midcourse Defense) are equipped with on-board discrimination to identify the true warhead from among decoys and associated objects.
Terminal Phase Capability
During its terminal phase the Igla warhead travels at hypersonic speeds (Mach 6) and employs electromagnetic shielding. The combination of stealth and maneuvering make it difficult for the either the IR sensors on an interceptor missiles or their ground based guidance radar of the interceptor missiles to track the Igla. Even if they do sporadically track the Igla the latter's Mach 6 speeds make an interception near impossible.
Conclusion
Clearly, the Topol M and Bulava missile systems represent a significant milestone in strategic weapon systems.
They are currently not deployed in numbers large enough to threaten the US, and probably never will be.
These systems signal an attempt by Russia to flex its technological muscles - not to threaten the US but alert it to power and excellence elsewhere.
One thing the Igla warhead does not signal is the irrelevance of BMD. It is not technology that countries like North Korea and Iran can acquire for decades to come. If anything the Igla reiterates what the US has always claimed - Its BMD is not designed to upset its strategic balance with Russia but to reduce the threat from rouge nations.
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