Comments: Flat Nested Threaded Embedded Oldest First Newest First Indian ICBM - A flawed deterrent! By ArjunHindustan on Sunday, December 25, 2005 (EST) Its very interesting and disappointing when your logic tends to lead to you to conclude that the Indian ICBM deterrent is a flawed policy decision. Do you think our enemies have just ended with Pakistan and China, this is the beginning. Remember in world politics there are never true or permanent friends, only true or permanent interests. On what basis can you proclaim that the USA and India will never ever fight. Anything can happen and is possible. Agreed that the USA is a distant and kind of non threat for now and for maybe decades to come, but do not rule out any possibility especially when our energy needs is growing and we are bound to clash with the interests of big powers like China and USA in the long run. So an ICBM capability definitely makes not just sense but common sense to have or field such a capability. Agreed that countries like USA and maybe some western european nations might field very advanced ABM systems like super advanced Patriots and stuff, but who cares look at Russia as soon as USA deployed ABM's they have tested a new ICBM and even deployed it called Bulava (or streaking or zig-zag ICBM's) for which USA and others have no answer just as of now. Next do you really think all European countries are our friends, Do you think all Arabs will be our friends. There are lots of threats what if a rogue Arab nation threatens missile strikes on us, dont we need to field capability of long range ICBM's or IRBM's. What is a rogue European nation threatens us with nukes (who knows how international relations might shape up) Countries like USA, France, Germany or Italy for that matter any one can become the worst enemy. Its all a big power game. What if a rogue nation like Venezuela starts threating the whole of Asian continent with ICBM's tipped with nukes (if they get it from China or North Korea or Iran). So your vision is very very narrow minded when you say India fielding ICBM's will bring the wrath of western nations. What happened to India 7 years after we exploded nuke bombs. We are more respected now than ever before. So ICBM's are just as vital for us to field, I would say we should field ICBM's to cover every country on earth so that no one threatens us. Its just Insurance, well lets start working on ICBM'w which will defeat ABM's like Patriots. But for sure we need ICBM's. Reply to this Comment Average Rating: Indian ICBM - A flawed deterrent! By ArjunHindustan on Sunday, December 25, 2005 (EST) By the way have you read this. Its interesting. ‘India Checkmates America –– 2017’ by Gen S Padmanabhan An Exclusive IDC Book Review New Delhi, 25 January 2004 A book by a thinking General, who steered the Indian Army through Op Parakaram in 2001–2002, which makes very interesting reading indeed. The book launch is slated for early February but we give you a peek into the book. The 2017 scenario depicted in the book is plausible. Its main theme is about how India prepares to meet aggression against her by any developed country including the USA. The propensity of the USA to act unilaterally against other countries in disregard of the United Nations, was clearly demonstrated in the Iraq War in 2003. India too could face military action by the USA, under certain circumstances. In the book such a circumstance, a casus belli, is provided by Pakistan in 2017. A short, sharp war ensues between India and Pakistan. India wins a resounding victory. The USA, which had intervened in the war on the side of her ally Pakistan, finds itself checkmated by a completely transformed and resilient India. This book is in three parts. The first part covers the 15 years from 1989–2003, and deals selectively with how the policy of ‘Pre-emptive Intervention’ evolved and how Iraq became its hapless victim. The second part covers the next 15 years from 2003–2017. It is set generally in a South Asian context with the USA, a ‘lodger’ in Pakistan, playing a major role. India has been portrayed as a rapidly developing country having settled its border disputes with China in a spirit of mutual accommodation. A four-sided Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation is signed by India, China, Russia and Vietnam in 2015. The USA totally unhappy with the formation of this powerful grouping seeks an opportunity to degrade the new formation. Such an opportunity arises in 2017, thanks to the J&K problem. A ‘collision’ occurs between the USA and India with Pakistan also on the scene. The third part deals with the 60 hours of the conflict and its surprising conclusion. Peace is fully restored after meetings of the Security Council and various peacemakers. The author concludes by making a strong case for strengthening the United Nations and endowing it with the wherewithal to make its writ run. Failure to do this and more, the author apprehends, will impose on the nations of the world, a ‘Pax Americana’, which will have as infelicitous an end as ‘Pax Romana’ or ‘Pax Britannia’. For our visitors who go and buy this book or wish to enjoy the book, we give below the ORBAT of India and Pakistan under the heading ‘The Military Dispositions’, from open sources. This is to support the present peace initiatives as war between the two countries or the involvement of USA in the sub continent, projected by Gen S Padmanabhan in the first half of his book, will be to the detriment of the progress being made by India, which we are convinced will be a regional super power in the coming decade. We hope that our Supreme Commander Dr A P J Abdul Kalam's and now PM Vajpayee's dream can be realised. Reply to this Comment Fastest Way to ICBM By manish.bhakuni on Monday, February 06, 2006 (EST) What I probably think is that PSLV's first stage which has a thrust exceeding 129 tonnes can be used as a the first stage of the ICBM with upper(second and third)stage costituted by a triad of AGNI II missiles. Agni II has a core diameter of 1 meter while first stahe of PSLV is of 5.8 meters so integrating them together would not be a difficult task. The only work left is to integrate them together.The collective range would be around 4000+ kms and we would get MIRV's. Reply to this Comment Bulky Warheads By joe2020 on Tuesday, May 09, 2006 (EST) I think Thakurji is trying to point out to a flawed policy that has retarded our deterent. Since May 18 1974, our PMs have had in competent securiy & strategic advisors courtesy our form of democracy. Morarji desai rolled back our nuke acapabilities by several decades. Often our politicinas try to play the good good boy on the wold stage & make claims like we will not test any more. The 98 tests do not prove we have tactical or rather missile deliverable compact war heads like W-80/85 series. Just like our politicians & their way of thinking we are good at demonstartion & never put them to use. Our stattegies need to be planned for severala years to come including scenarios like US+ China together. However, the priority for a mitigation should be given to the top 30% of the threats rather than taking on an Italian or Maltese threat. these startegies need to be revised at least on a yearly basis. Ability to relatialte with MRV & creating irrversible damage on the enemy should be the core of our strategy & not sending a sateliite sized nuke on an ICBM. Reply to this Comment Flawless Indian Deterrent By Ruddy on Tuesday, November 28, 2006 (EST) Mr. Thakur , your assessment has some valid points but is heavily dependent on the one single media report you quote. There are more questions than answers and unless we know the answers to the following 3 questions , we cannot judge the strategic thinking of the indian forces. 1) What is the vision and identity of India , in this century and for the next few centuries? 2)How do we look at ourselves - as potential Power Pole or a perpetual Slave to East , West , North and South ?? 2) How unified is the Indian assessment and planning to deal with strategic threats ? 3) How efficient are the organisations that are supposed to deliver on the strategic plans? 4) How reliable and effective is our Strategic intelligence? Once these questions and their answers are clear to our policy makers - strategic or civilian , we cannot find the 'will' to develop and deploy and enforce our policies on potential friends or foes. Once we have the will , we will find that Indian Brain Power has enough limitless fuel to develop far more stunning and shocking applications and platforms to help our strategic goals. We should be leading the technology development in all fields . learn and adapt instead of depending on 'hope' that external powers would be reasonable. The very fact that today most of India is at the mercy of US , EU , China and Russian Nuclear rationality is very shocking - i cant even sleep peacefully - i am just a student and if thats how i feel , i wonder how any strategic planner , or a policy maker can ! but they do ! We need ICBMs , MRBMs , SRBMS , Nukes of every kind , shape and capacity , We need 'killer' satellites , spy satellites , We need Electromagnetic GigaWatt Beam weapons . We need a missile shield , Strategic Submarine Force , We need to dominate Land , Space , Air , Sea and Undersea , to protect Bharat. All these and everything else our super sharp guys and girls can come up with in the future. India is more than just a country - it represnets a value system , an in built world order that is exactly what the world needs. We need to dislodge Darwinian Jungle Law propogated by a myopic West and replace it with a Just World Order , which frankly and objectively only India can offer and Deliver - ie , if it identifies and views itself so. Reply to this Comment Average Rating: MIssile Defence By pravinutankar on Monday, December 04, 2006 (EST) Surely we can easly have ICBM cauze we have PSLV/GSLV hahaaha........In todays world more important is missile defence sheild(not yet named) and thats where India is concentrating more, surely our AGNI/Surya will progress.But now a days we also need missiled like Brahmos which r difficuly to defend cauze of their speed.India has taken the right step forward. Reply to this Comment ICBM By dgill45083 on Monday, June 04, 2007 (EST) Indian missile program is headed in the right direction. India is fully capable of making a ICBM. The missile is a platform, the real deal is the war-head. Till the mid 90s, India had a problem with miniaturizing the war-head for missiles. The platform was fully developed by 1989, it was the other part that caused problems. For now India's course of action should be a credible deterrence against China and all its rogue satellities, in this regard India is headed on the right track. Great site Reply to this Comment ICBM fallacy By rakeshkrishnan on Saturday, July 28, 2007 (EST) The sweeping statement that India doesn't need ICBMs reminds me of what the ancient kshatriyas and brahmins of India used to say - that only they could learn archery and other martial arts. India has paid dearly for Eklavya and Karna's maltreat. Today, the US acts like Drona and India is treated like Eklavya. Well, I think we have paid our dues for over a 1000 years and now it's time we took our rightful place in the world. The future is India's. I reproduce below part of a book review I wrote once. The book is named Second Strike by Rajesh Rajagopalan. The key part is the statement by McGeorge Bundy. My point, based on Bundy's statement, is even if India has just one ICBM (surely we wouldn't stop at that figure), it would discourage any kind of nuclear blackmail by any country similar to the 1971 nuclear gunboat diplomacy by the US Seventh Fleet. Here goes. Nuclear trigger: Method in the MADness The author --- an associate professor in international politics at Jawaharlal Nehru University --- takes a close look at the Cold War and other crises, and suggests that the equation that kept the peace among the cold warriors long after World War II, and which lasted until the Soviet Union imploded, holds good for subcontinental N-powers India and Pakistan. The West's window of vulnerability and the mutually assured destruction (MAD) theory, that are now remembered perhaps only by the Pentagon hawks, are addressed through the India-Pakistan prism. Rajagopalan's account of the Cuban Missile Crisis is one of the most compelling accounts of that near-apocalyptic event, which has immediate relevance in the Indo-Pak context. The decision to place Soviet missiles in Cuba was taken in May 1962 by Premier Nikita Khrushchev to defend the island nation against the very real possibility of an American invasion. The author says that if any crisis should have resulted in war, it was the Cuban crisis because of the enormous complexities of the crisis, the trouble that both sides had in controlling their respective military forces, the difficulties Krushchev and John F Kennedy faced in convincing their colleagues that a less than honourable peace was better than war, and the communication problems that bedevilled negotiations between the leaders. So why was the crisis resolved short of war? Whatever political leaders might say in peacetime, argues the author, they do behave with great care when dealing with nuclear weapons in a crisis. In 1962, both sides had declaratory policies, which if faithfully followed, would have resulted in a nuclear war. While both Soviet field commanders and US air forces had been granted liberal release powers, what happened in reality was that at the height of the crisis, the apex political leadership re-asserted control over nuclear weapons, including battlefield nukes. Rajagopalan brings out a little known fact of the crisis, a fact that is always glossed over by the Western media. In exchange for Moscow removing the missiles from Cuba, the Americans carted away the Jupiter missiles they had installed in Turkey, which was a major reason for Soviet brinkmanship in Cuba. Going by Rajagopalan's theory, India's superiority in nuclear bombs is no guarantee of complete superiority over Pakistan. In 1962, the US had 5,000 warheads compared with the Soviet Union's 300. But this 17:1 advantage played little part in the confrontation. Then and subsequently, many participants believed it was the threat of a nuclear war itself that deterred the US from acting on its superiority. According to McGeorge Bundy, the author of existential deterrence, "We had to assume that in any nuclear exchange, no matter who started it, some of these missiles and bombers would get through with megaton bombs. Even one would a disaster. We had no interest in any nuclear exchange other than to avoid it. The fact that our own strategic forces were very much larger gave us no comfort." Not a very comforting thought for South Block. But what is of more relevance to India is that the dog that didn't bark in the Cuban crisis was not Soviet restraint but American restraint. Soviet restraint may be understandable, considering their relative weakness. Rajagopalan says the American restraint, despite their overwhelming advantage is counter-intuitive. And difficult to explain, except as the consequence of the fear of nuclear war itself. Conclusion: if superiority and inferiority do not matter when dealing with nuclear weapons, numbers and balances are irrelevant. Rajagopalan does not entirely dismiss the utility of a superior arsenal. For instance, during the Sino-Soviet border clashes in 1968-69, when the Chinese began their reckless "systematic provocations" and ambushed Soviet patrols, Moscow went ballistic. Its propaganda machine played up the "lethal armaments and modern means of delivery" at the USSR's disposal. Moscow sent letters to several communist parties in the West warning of the possibility of an attack on Chinese nuclear facilities. The Soviet air force in the Far East was ramped up to high alert, interpreted by the US as a preparation for a possible attack. And finally, in a move that created panic in Washington, a Soviet diplomat asked a State Department official how the US would react to a Soviet attack on Chinese nuclear facilities. The policy of intimidation worked; the Chinese military retreated and Beijing pleaded it had no interest in a war. In the extremely engaging chapter on Kargil, Second Strike dismisses the threat of nuclear blackmail by Pakistan. Was the Pakistani decision to undertake the operation the consequence of its belief that the presence of nukes would prevent India from reacting to a bold Pakistani strike across the LoC? Was stability at the strategic level breeding instability at the lower levels? "Obviously, Pakistan had miscalculated India's response to interventions in previous cases, such as in 1947-48 and 1965. Unlike those cases, in Kargil, Pakistan was constrained from supporting its forces and had to allow them to slowly destroyed. If Pakistan really though that its nuclear weapons could hold off an Indian response, it is curious that Pakistan chose to keep its intervention covert." The author systematically trashes the West's argument that nuclear bombs are inherently unsafe in the hands of the two neighbours. "Caution becomes the defining principle of nuclear-armed powers. They learn quickly that brinkmanship strategies of the conventional world are dangerous when the adversaries are armed with nuclear weapons. Mutual vulnerability becomes a way of preventing mutual destruction." Second Strike is seat of the pants reading. Compared with it, other writing on the Indian nuclear scenario seems like kindergarten stuff. Reply to this Comment thakur is wrong By dshanshanker on Monday, October 15, 2007 (EST) yes sir i agree with ur comment that india needs an ICBM as we are aspiring to become a UNSC's permanent member and to pose any threat to any neighbour but to demonstrate that we are capaqble of striking them before they could wake up as being offensive during a war is the best self defence Reply to this Comment

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