Vijainder K Thakur
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    Tejas LCA
    Posted by on Sunday, October 10, 2004 (EST)
    Because of delays in its planned induction, the Tejas does not adequately address the current and future threats faced by the IAF. There is a strong case for encouraging the IAF and ADA to think beyond the Tejas
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    Introduction

    A Marut of 31 Sqn IAF at the AF Museum, PalamThe recent news, curiously enough reported only by ¹Calcutta telegraph to best of my knowlede, that the Kaveri engine being built to power the Tejas LCA had failed in high altitude simulation test on the ground was a disappointment. However, it was not a surprise. Bangalore based Gas Turbine and Research Organization, GTRE, has in the past failed to deliver on the HJE-2500 engine for the Kiran jet trainer or come up with anything credible when the Maruts languished for want of a suitable engine during the 70s. Its ability to come up with a GE F404 replacement was suspect at the very best, more likely quixotic.

    ²Air Chief Marshal S. Krishnaswamy on October 6 acknowledged the setback in Kaveri development when he recommended a mid-term quality review of the Kaveri aero-engine

    As part of my research on strategic affairs I frequent numerous web sites that focus on India's emergence as a military power. The enthusiasm expressed on most such forums by young Indians for Defense Research Projects managed by the DRDO, such as the LCA, Arjun MBT and the Brahmos is gratifying. Unfortunately, there is no similar enthusiasm for DRDO products within the defense forces. The IAF is not as thrilled as the young people on these forums about the proposed induction of the LCA. Clearly, there is a serious disconnect and I will attempt to address in these columns in the coming days.

    The Marut (HF-24) Experience

    The Marut was the first fighter designed and produced in India. The legendary Dr Kurt Tank, of Focke Wolf 191 fame, led the team of aircraft designers in the 1950s to produce what was an excellent airframe. However, from its inception right upto its retirement in 1980, the Marut lacked a suitable power plant.

    The Marut saga is a story of dismal project management and illustrates the inordinate sway of the Indian Defense Research Establishment over critical defense procurement decisions.

    This aircraft D-1256 in a museum called Flugwerft Oberschleißheim near Munich. I think I have flown this one too but am not sure.The Indian Air Force was never enthusiastic about inducting it. The aircraft's combat performance was dismal and so was its weapon load. Its high pressure hydraulic system was prone to frequent failures and its canopy and ejection systems had serious defects. During its short service life the Marut fleet was grounded for many months on many occasions.

    The Maruts participated in the 1971 war but accomplished little more than pin prick strikes thanks to their limited payload. Their ability to fly at over 600 K at tree top levels, however, stood them in good stead and helped them escape attacking Sabres. Indeed, during the 1970s the three Marut squadrons operated by the IAF were more cause for worry to the Air Marhsals of the IAF than the Air Marhsals of the PAF.

    I started my career in the IAF as a Marut pilot (1975-1980) and flew nearly 700 hrs on it. I had the dubious distinction of participating in its decommissioning in 1980 when the Air Force finally decided to give up on it. One of my last sorties on the Marut was a flight to Kanpur to deliver a spanking new aircraft to Kanpur for cocooning.

    It was only when I went to Jaguars that I understood how potent a fighter jet could be just as how much more fun flying a fighter could be.

    The point that I am trying to make here is that for good reason the IAF has not been happy with what the Defense Research Establishment in India has had to offer. The Marut is just one of the examples. I am aware of more. This is not to suggest that the IAF is not appreciative of the effort to indigenize. It is, but its responsibility to procure the best weapon systems within our limited resources is greater.

    Tejas – Too Little Too Late

    Tejas TD-1 and TD-2The recent news stories on the Kaveri engine setback should prompt some introspection – Is the Tejas going the Marut way? Will it be rammed down the IAF's throat by the Defense Research Establishment just as the Marut was nearly 40 years ago? Doing so may serve national pride but it will certainly not serve national defense.

    Pressure is being brought on the IAF to commit in large numbers to the Tejas. What does the IAF really know about Tejas that will enthuse it to commit to it? The fact that it uses FBW technology? That is history…40 years old history. Besides, it is not FBW that combat pilot seek it is maneuverability that comes from it. Or better still the super maneuverability that comes from thrust vectoring and extremely high thrust to weight ratios. In addition our pilots need stealth. They do not want to be knocked out of the skies by BVR missiles that are now widely available. The Tejas has very little to offer in the areas of high thrust to weight ratios, thrust vectoring and stealth.

    Clearly ADA has taken too long to develop the Tejas. A 20 years lead time to develop a fighter aircraft is unrealistic. I have seen attempts to refute this contention through suggestions that the F-22 Raptor too has not yet been inducted in large numbers by the USAF despite having taken to the skies over a decade back. However, such suggestions are misleading. Delay in the induction of the Raptor are due to the fact that the US Congress is not yet convinced that the threat that the Raptor is designed to address really exists. In the case of the IAF, the threat that the LCA was conceived to address existed right through the 80s and 90s. However, the LCA remained on the drawing boards and consequently the threat was never addressed. Five years from now, if the LCA is indeed available for induction, the type of threat that the IAF will face is not something that the Tejas was conceived to address.

    Having said the above, let me state unequivocally, that delays not withstanding, I am proud of what the ADA has achieved and I think the whole nation should be. I for one do not doubt that the Tejas will one day impress the IAF enough to be inducted. However, what I am objecting to here is the possibility that the IAF's punch is compromised by its wait for the Tejas. That is not fair to the brave fighters who defend our skies just as it is not fair to the taxpayers who fund the defense budget in the belief that the nation's armed foreces get the best equipment possible to fight with.

    Even if the Tejas is not inducted into the IAF it will be an achievement that the nation could be proud of. Pure technology development figher aircraft are not uncommen. The Russian Berkut Su-37 and MiG 35 are examples. India needs to fund defense research and development so that we are not dependent on other nations for our security. It is my contention that ADA must be paid by the nation for their excellent effort through the budget of the DRDO not the IAF.

    If and when the Tejas is ready for induction it is important that the IAF must have a choice whether to induct it or not. It is equally important that ADA must be encouraged to move on to a stealthy and super maoneuverable derivative of the Tejas

    PS I report on Defence matters because India spends nearly 20% of its budget on Defence. Two of Inda's neighbors openly covet her territory and don't foresake the use of violence to get it. Under the circumstances I think it is imperative that all Indians follow matters of defence closely. Our history, distant and recent, is replete with invasions that we invited upon ourselves by not being adequately prepared.

    If you would like to contribute a picture or article to this blog I will be delighted to hear from you.

    Ref:
    ¹http://www.telegraphindia.com/1040930/asp/frontpage/story_3822650.asp
    ²http://www.indianexpress.com/full_story.php?content_id=56530

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    Tejas Induction
    By ssangwan2000 on Wednesday, November 17, 2004 (EST)
    The author is naive to think that IAF has the last word on induction of equipment in the IAF – it does not. I can explain but I think it is quite unnecessary as it is an open secret.
    But he is right that the IAF should have the choice. We assume that the Air Marshals making the choice are well informed about national priorities, are of sound mind and do not have a skewed psychology of “Fighter pilot first always and every time”. There are many more factors that need to be considered in making a choice.

    “If and when the Tejas is ready for induction it is important that the IAF must have a choice whether to induct it or not.” I don’t get it…….. Who’s going to decide if it is ready for induction? The IAF or DRDO or the Cabinet or the PM and if it is decided that the LCA is ready for induction, then where is the question of choice! The previous effort of building on the experience gained in development of HF24 was derailed by the IAF. It just can not be allowed to happen again. The nation needs to build on the experience gained. I think ACM Krishnamurthy knows which way the wind blows and has wisely decided to support the indigenous effort wholeheartedly. The ADA is planning on MCA which talks about stealth etc. Also research and development is an ongoing process so what we see today as LCA is not the last word – it can be and will be improved as we go along. The baby of Indian aerospace industry needs a little bit of hand holding just as any baby does. This one is special too because it has come at an enormous cost.

    It is sad but I have to say that the Indian armed forces need civilian oversight or else we would never see indigenization happening at all. Right now it appears the IAF can not even manage their promotion boards properly.

    Whilst it is very important that we need to give our fighting forces the best of equipment, it is more important that more and more equipment is not only manufactured at home but also researched and developed at home. That will provide a greater and truer measure of security in the longer run than importing and relying on imported equipment.

    In my opinion LCA is just a token of much greater things to follow. As the nation gains confidence through success stories in IT, space technology, missile programs and so on, the pessimists amidst us will gradually be forced to take the backseat and the nation will finally be able to grow to its full potential.

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    LCA as a test bed
    By jgeorge on Thursday, November 18, 2004 (EST)
    I believe that more than just a stepping stone, the LCA Tejas will play an important role as a test bed for new technologies and developments. For instance, more advanced flight-control algorithms can be loaded onto it's flight computer. It can also be used for development of advanced electronic subsystems such as Active Phased-array radars, which have already been developed (although as a ground based system) in India. Other systems currently found only in such aircraft as the Raptor like passive radar detectors can be developed and tested using the LCA. You may argue that the same can be done with other aircraft too, but since the entire system is designed in-house, we know more about it and dont have to spend time figuring out how someone else did something.
    The present radar system on the LCA is probably not the best in the world, but it is the first airborne radar India is fielding. Once we get the basic system operational, the advanced signal processing techniques etc. can be integrated later.

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    Start an enterprise togather !!
    By ballabhyadav on Friday, January 07, 2005 (EST)
    we must all contribute to our country in high tech area, hey guys how about forming a consortium, mabe a small organisation to start with small tech items like light armour or communication devices , so that we can contribute as a business and as a tech provider to the country, atleast i plan to do that alone if noone is with me, please email who all is interested: ballabhyadav@hotmail.com

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    LCA and its contribution
    By NV on Sunday, January 16, 2005 (EST)
    VKThakur,

    About the following:

    1.Stealth- the LCA has a third of the RCS of its peers, thanks to its composite structure. This was disclosed by the ADA recently, after tests etc.

    2. The LCA is eminently suitable to be the critical bulk of the IAF, even in the 21st century the USAF etc will still be reliant on Low RCS not completely stealth platforms to perform the bulk of the tasks. The F22's role can be mtached by joining up for the PAK-FA and by a LO derivative of the LCA, namely the MCA.

    3.The delays in the LCA can be frustrating but please notice almost all other nations have faced much worse despite their extensive experience.
    The Eurofighter, Rafale all have been highly delayed.

    4.The LCA is having a positive effect on todays IAF. The HAL is able to upgrade MiG's on its own asking OEM's for product support as and when necessary. The MiG27's and Jaguars and even Su30MKI's are all using LCA derived technology.

    Eg the MiG27 upgrade


    1.The Mission Computers are from the DARE of DRDO, from the LCA program. They are combined with the display processors and are integrated in a single system called the CORE AVIONICS COMPUTER.

    2.The HOTAS controls are from the DRDO and HAL developed for the LCA.

    3.The Communication equipment is from the INCOM package- the INDian COMmunication system.

    4.The IFF is from HAL.

    5.The RadarWarning Receivers are the Tarang made by BEL-India designed by DRDO and BEL. Also present on the MiG 21 Bison.

    6.The chaff dispensers are now being made at Bharat Dynamics Ltd, Hyderabad.

    7.The overall design, system architecture and upgrade responsibility rests with HAL.

    8.The Stores Management System is from the LCA and is designed by ADA.

    9.The Self Protection Jammer is the Tempest, from DRDO.
    Its also present on the IAF's Jaguars as the Tusker pod.

    Enough thrashing or do you want more yet?

    10.Certification is by CEMILAC and ASTE. Test flights are conducted by the HAL Test crew seconded from the IAF.

    11. Airframe life work based on studies done by HAL and NAL.



    http://csirwebistad.org/aesi/pages/coreavionics.htm



    Quote:

    Core Avionics for Combat Aircraft Upgrades
    RP Ramalingam, Director, PM Soundar Rajan, Project Director, Defence Avionics Research Establishment, Bangalore


    Avionics systems play a decisive role in the mission effectiveness of today’s combat aircraft. Most of the countries across the world operate combat aircraft which are at-least twenty to thirty years old. Upgrading their avionics is the only means of keeping them effectively operational. But this upgradation should be carried out in a timely and cost effective manner in order to be fruitful. To achieve this, a concept of “Core Avionics” has been evolved. Avionics systems tend to be very complex and are aptly called “system of systems”. They are expensive and consume a lot of time to design, integrate and test. Core avionics addresses the central integrating technology with a basic common set of functions required for any combat aircraft. It consists of modular hardware and software that performs core mission functions. These modules could be configured for use in ground attack or air-superiority avionics. In practice, the concept of core avionics has been applied to three aircraft programmes, currently in progress (of which one has been inducted into service). The core concept is evolutionary and expands itself to accommodate advancements in electronics and information technologies.



    Introduction

    Avionics systems have grown in importance and complexity and have equaled or surpassed the airframe or engine in terms of contribution to mission effectiveness and cost. The growing number of avionics upgrades of old aircraft across the world. substantiate this. At DARE we have taken due note of this and have established competence to design, develop and integrate avionics systems. The avionics system in general consists of sensors, processing subsystems, Control & Display subsystem and weapon system. The main subsystems which play a pivotal role, termed as Core Avionics are the Mission Computer cum Display Processor which also hosts the interfaces for all the other subsystems. This paper describes the concept of core avionics hardware and software and brings out the evolution of practical systems.



    Core Avionics

    Combat aircraft avionics systems can be broadly divided into two areas.

    Sensors such as INS /GPS for position sensing; Laser Rangers for air-to-ground target ranging; Radar for air-to-air target detection and ranging - depending upon the role of the aircraft (ground attack / air superiority / multi-role) suitable sensors can be selected.
    Core Avionics - consists of processors that collect information from the sensors, perform weapon and navigation computations and present the required cues and information on a Head Up Display, Multi-Function Displays and Up Front Control Panel. The Core avionics computer will also interface to a data logging /retrieval system. All these functions are generic - they are required on any upgraded aircraft. Aircraft specific interfaces are required to interface with stores management systems, Air data systems etc.




    Background
    DARE took up the development and delivery in quantities of Mission Computers, Display Processors and Radar Computers for the Su 30 avionics upgrade. The requirements were analysed and instead of building three different computers DARE developed nine functional modules. The chassis was also common across the computers. These modules use state of the art processors. They are designed as independent modules to do a specific function such as generating computer generated imagery for display on HUD or MFD. But they are able to communicate with the main processor module through high speed Dual Ported RAMs. This makes development of software for these specific functions as independent activities. Also, HW changes in one module does not affect the other modules. Hence this approach reaps the benefits of Open System Architectures to the full. Later when proposals for upgrade of the MiG 27 aircraft came up, DARE could respond with a ready solution by configuring the Display Processor of the Su30 avionics. The evolution is brought out in the following table.

    Su 30 Computer
    MiG 27 CAC
    Jaguar CAC

    Common Modules
    Main Processor Module
    Yes
    Yes

    1553B interface Module
    Yes
    Yes

    Colour Symbol Gen. Module
    Yes
    Yes

    Stroke Symbol Gen. Module
    Yes
    Yes

    Discrete Interface Module
    Yes (qty 2)
    Yes

    Power Supply Module
    Yes
    Yes

    Chassis
    Yes
    Yes

    Aircraft Specific Modules (for CAC only)
    Video Switching Module
    Yes
    Yes

    Analog / Synchro Interface Module
    Yes
    Yes




    Core Avionics Hardware

    The Core Avionics Computer (CAC) developed by DARE is housed in a aircraft industry standard 3/4 th ATR chassis with an option rear mount ARINC 404 connector or front mounted 38999 series connectors. The tray is mounted in the equipment bay/rack of the aircraft and the computer is plugged in to the tray. It is forced air cooled and weighs less than 8 Kg. It works on both 115V 400Hz AC and 28V DC aircraft power supplies and consumes less than 80 W of power. It is modular and houses the following modules which are built using COTS components.

    a) General purpose processor module is based on Intel X86 processor. Upgradable 2MB of Flash and 2MB of high speed memories hosting real time operating system kernels enhance programming capability.

    b) Colour Symbol Generator Module hosts a i486DX4 based Raster symbol generator with Anti-aliased Graphic Library which generates a STANAG 3350 compatible Video (RGB) output to drive Multi Function Displays.

    c) Stroke Symbol Generator Module hosts a i486DX4 based vector symbol generator and drives one Head Up Display with 1024x1024 pixels resolution

    d) Mil-Std-1553B Interface Module is based on powerful 1553B controller chip supported by a i386EX processor and provides up to two dual redundant buses with Bus Controller / Remote Terminal options. In addition it provides for eight Receive and three Transmit ARINC 429 interfaces. It also interfaces analog inputs for various levels and ranges.

    e) Analog Interface Module provides 32 analog outputs, 8 synchro inputs and three synchro outputs. The module supports Russian / NATO standards and Synchro / Resolver formats.

    f) Discrete Interfaces module supports 64 inputs and 32 outputs. Various input / output levels such as 28V, 5V, Open/Close etc are supported. Outputs are capable of driving high current relays.

    g) Video Switching Unit accepts various sensor videos and routes them to various displays / recorders.

    f) Dual Mode Power supplymodule works on 115V 400Hz, 1 Phase / 28V DC aircraft power supply, the AC power being the primary source.

    g) Chassis is force air cooled. It houses up to nine functional modules and conforms to 3/4 ATR; with front mounted 38999 circular connectors.


    CAC Architecture

    CAC architecture is based on Open System principles. Intelligent functional modules communicate with the Main Processor module via Dual Ported Random Access Memories. Each of the modules are treated as extension of the Main Processors memory map. The mother board runs the basic address, data and control lines of the Main Processor. This results in maximum possible data transfer speeds between the Main Processor and the modules. This also allows easy expansion as the interface between modules could be done in software.

    CAC Architecture


    CAC Functions
    The following are the functions of various modules of the CAC
    a) Through the CPU module:
    Control of the 1553B interface

    Primary mission, navigation and weapon computations
    Air Data Computations
    Control of the UFCP for avionics system moding and data insertion and data readout.
    Management of the display system (MFDs and HUD)
    Management of the Stores (weapons) system
    Reading and writing of mission data from the Data Loader Flash Disk.
    Coordination of LDP and FLIR for navigation and targetting functions
    Auto-pilot function


    b) Through the Colour Symbol Generator and Monochrome Symbol Generator Modules:

    i) Raster mode writing on the MFDs in colour (mixing with external sensor video)

    ii) Stroke Mode writing on the HUD in monochrome.

    c) Through the Intelligent Dual channel 1553B interface board: Provide for the exchange of data among avionics subsystems in the primary and reversionary modes; Control of the ARINC 429 channels; Interface air data system, hand controller etc through the analog inputs.

    Through Discrete Interface Module Interface aircraft discretes including the HOTAS switches to the CPU board and Interface the CAC’s discrete outputs to the stores management system.
    e) Through Synchro and Analog output Module interface the automatic flight control system and Crash Data recorder system.

    f) Through the Video switching module provide for switching the video signals in the avionics system to the MFD, HUD and the Video Tape Recorder.



    Core Avionics Software
    Software is the backbone of the core avionics concept. There are many functions that are required to be performed in modern fighter planes, which are common. These functions are reusable in most of the aircrafts, with due modifications. Following paragraphs highlight some of such functions, which form the core of the avionics that can be adapted to different aircraft:


    Navigation Function:

    The heart of the navigation function is the basic sensor, which provides either position directly, or velocities at every instant. From the basic data of the sensors the navigation parameters are deduced by a common algorithm and logic, which forms part of the core functions.




    Presentation function of guidance and other parameters:

    Integrated multi purpose display devices are becoming increasingly inevitable items of the modern fighter aircrafts. The Head Up Display and the Multi Function Display are extensively used for displaying basic flight parameters, guidance cues and warning information. Over the period many standards have evolved in presentation of the parameters through these displays. This situation brings about the commonality and standardization in symbolic representation of specific parameters. This in turn leads to common algorithms and logic. The symbol library and the control logics developed for the Su30 are reusable in most of the aircrafts.



    Weapon delivery algorithms:

    The basic equations governing the trajectory of weapons like bombs, rockets and bullets require very few parameters specific to the type of weapons. Once they are released from the parent vehicle, the behavior of these projectiles is predictable knowing the initial conditions of release and the environmental conditions. The sensors used for weapon aiming calculations eventually give the range of the target from the aircraft along with elevation and azimuth angles, irrespective of the type of sensor, be it radar or laser. Hence common algorithms are usable by providing the specific parameters to the weapon being delivered.

    Guidance Functions:

    There are many guidance functions starting from guiding the pilot to reach the required take-off attitude through guidance to release the weapon at the right moment and more. All these functions are re-usable by feeding the base parameters specific to the aircraft and the weapons selected. “Quickening” of the guidance cues also to a great extent is governed by mathematical equations, though the coefficients in the equations are empirically derived through simulation and fine-tuned during flight trials.

    The core guidance functions are:

    a) Homing Guidance

    b) Navigation Guidance as per Flight Plan

    c) Speed Guidance

    d) AOA and ILS guidance for landing



    Aircraft Upgrade Programmes

    The Core Avionics Concept derived from the successfully inducted Su30 MKI programme has resulted in two new upgrade programmes. The MiG 27 Upgrade programme is progressing well under challenging time frames. This has been possible only because the hardware and software resources from the Su30 programme are being re-used. The software development process could be started even before the development of the I/O modules. 90% of the Symbols are also being re-used. The Jaguar Upgrade programme also utilizes identical computer hardware and the symbol library. The computer modules have been designed to interface with Russian as well as Western systems. The Core Concept has also resulted in common symbologies across the fleet resulting in ease of conversion training.



    Conclusion

    The concept of Core Avionics has been discussed. Using the functional modules, both hardware and software, developed for Su 30 in MiG and Jaguar upgrades has resulted in considerable financial benefits and has made the upgrade development feasible in terms of time frames. With this approach, other aircraft could be upgraded in a cost effective and timely manner. We could have ‘time to first flight ‘ as low as 12 to 15 months from the programme go-ahead for a new upgrade.



    I

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    Clarification
    By NV on Tuesday, January 18, 2005 (EST)
    This line:


    Enough thrashing or do you want more yet?

    was not directed at you, it was merely part of the original text which I forgot to remove.

    My apologies!

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    Inconsistencies in the blog
    By jagadish on Sunday, January 23, 2005 (EST)
    Sir, I would like to point out some inconsistencies in the article.
    First, you have stated that the F22 raptors induction is delayed because the US does not see a threat to justify a quarter billion dollar stealth plane, then you go on to say that India needs a stealthy supermaneouverable plane. I fail to understand how India can justify a stealth plane, when the US with its global interests and involvement in every conflict in the world cannot justify it. Afterall, India's adversaries are still flying Mig 21 copies.
    Secondly, you suggest that Tejas was designed and developed to face the threats of 80's and 90's and may not be suitable for 2005. But, when I go through the technical specifications of tejas, I have seen that it is as good as the Sweedish Gripen which is considered an advanced plane (needless to say that it runs on the same engine). Further, the IAF is flying Mig21, which is a 2nd generation airframe with limited load capabilites but is still considered a potential adversary by the USAF (per ur blog). So, Tejas, which is a 4+ generation plane with >40% composite (hence low RCS) and higher load should serve much better in IAF. Besides, IAF is trying to aquire french Mirage jets, after careful evaluation, which will serve till 2030. Tejas is but a mini mirage in all aspects, but a bit more advanced owing to latest avionics.So, why rule it as an inferior fighter not geared for a modern airforce?

    IAF's Su30MKI to meet any threats from chinese, and it only needs a cheaper single engine, medium tech fighter to do the grunt work, and Tejas more than fits that role as it shares the same avionics of the MKI.

    Finally, India with its meager budget allotments is finding hard to develop a 4th generation fighter. If this is not inducted, I donot see ADA getting further orders to develop new fighters.

    All in all, I think that the IAF should induct atleast two squadrons of Tejas by 2010 if it meets all the design goals and ADA should develop it further to bring out a block 20 Tejas.

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    Who makes the call?
    By vkthakur on Sunday, January 23, 2005 (EST)
    Jagdish you make your point well. It is true that India does not have the resources to develop a fighter that combines stealth, super maneuverability and super cruise. But that is no reason why the IAF should be forced to use an aircraft that does not adequately address its threat perceptions. Good fighter aircraft that meet IAF requirements can be procured from several different sources abroad at much lower overall costs. Besides, it makes so much more sense to partner with the Russians in developing the next generation fighter.

    I share your enthusiasm for the technology that ADA is attempted to imbibe with the LCA. However, a good fighter aircraft is much more than a flying machine. It is about good combat performance, good pilot visibility, good avionics, good weapon systems and payloads. For example, a FBW system will mean little to an IAF fighter pilot pitted against an F-16 or Chengdu FC-1 unless the FBW translates into better maneuverability in close combat. That may happen, but we don't know as yet. At the very least the Tejas must clearly demonstrate better overall performance than the MIG-21-93. In this context please refer to my article Tejas – Untempered Exuberence

    The Tejas has yet to mature and when it does the IAF will need to evaluate its performance against the alternatives available to it. I hope Tejas gets the nod from the IAF. But clearly the choice is for the Air Force to make.

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    LCA
    By NV on Saturday, January 29, 2005 (EST)
    Jagdish you make your point well. It is true that India does not have the resources to develop a fighter that combines stealth, super maneuverability and super cruise. But that is no reason why the IAF should be forced to use an aircraft that does not adequately address its threat perceptions.
    _______________________________________
    VKThakur,

    Yes, but at what cost? Can India acquire 200 plus PAK-FA's? The MKI came in at around 40 Million$, the LCA is half that. Given the fact that the PAK-FA will be a generation ahead of the MKI and a two engine a/c, unlike the LCA- its per unit costs and operation costs will be much higher!

    Secondly, it would be unwise to put all our eggs in one basket. I am sure you know how the Russians normally use the IAF BRD and HAL as scapegoats when it came to serviceability problems. Things will be eased if we have an extensive aeronautical industry of our own and the Russians know it.

    _____________________________________
    VKThakur :
    Good fighter aircraft that meet IAF requirements can be procured from several different sources abroad at much lower overall costs. Besides, it makes so much more sense to partner with the Russians in developing the next generation fighter.

    __________________________________

    I disagree about the overall costs!
    This is clearly incorrect. Please point out any A/C with lower overall costs.

    The Mirage 2000- V is being sold at approx 40 Million$ apiece.
    The Su30MKI- HAL produced touches the scales at the same.
    The Gripen - apart from the cost- has significant American components- and is a strategic liability. Its engine is a Ge404 derivative like the LCA's but then its FCS and Actuators are Moog. A high proportion of its onboard avionics and electromechanical subassemblies are sourced from American firms! In the case of the LCA, ISRO and other other allied orgs are indigenizing the actuators, the Kaveri when it comes will probably supplant the Ge404 IN20 and in time with patience we can attempt to indigenize all those components of the LCA which are currently sourced from Europe. On the Other hand, the Gripen despite being Swedish has American systems a plenty!
    Asking for replacement is not a joke- that will shoot up acquisition costs (eg the Hawk deal where we had to ask BAe for replacing all US made subassemblies) and the Gripen s a modern day a/c, mucking around with a system architecture will be tough. Ask the Turks- they couldnt include a French Radar Warning Receiver in their US made F-16's. The systems would not talk to each other!

    I agree that cooperation with the Russians is essential - regarding the PAK-FA. But at the same time, we have to push for the LCA as well.

    _____________________________________

    VKThakur,
    I share your enthusiasm for the technology that ADA is attempted to imbibe with the LCA. However, a good fighter aircraft is much more than a flying machine. It is about good combat performance, good pilot visibility, good avionics, good weapon systems and payloads. For example, a FBW system will mean little to an IAF fighter pilot pitted against an F-16 or Chengdu FC-1 unless the FBW translates into better maneuverability in close combat. That may happen, but we don't know as yet. At the very least the Tejas must clearly demonstrate better overall performance than the MIG-21-93. In this context please refer to my article Tejas – Untempered Exuberence
    ____________________________________

    This is the point where contradictions emerge:

    On the one hand you note:
    1.The IAF needs a fifth gen stealth a/c based upon threat perception-
    True, that would be the PAK-FA but it would be targetted against high value elements and we cant afford it in the numbers game- 200-300!

    2.Then you note, it should be better than the F-16 or the Chengdu FC-1.

    If the LCA's ASR's are met- it should be equal to the task.

    3.It should be better than the 21-93

    The ASR's definitely exceed the 21-93.

    Why not give the LCA a chance and see how it pans out?

    FBW is attuned to a/c manoueverability, when properly implemented. If it werent, the MKI would not have transitioned to a Quad Duplex FBW unless it had to. It would have retained the original Su27's quasi analog hydraulic system.

    Second, the FC1 too is an a.c in development- its just that its a MiG21 derivative, though reworked.
    Now the Chinese have the foresight to invest in their own aerospace industry and go for a low performance, yet local product and the PAF is willing to plump for it. In the case of the LCA, if the IAF remains involved and pushes the project, there is no reason why it wont deliver.

    Please look at the Navy. They make their own ships! If they have to import certain subassemblies- they go ahead and do so, but at the end of the day they have the ability to design and field platforms tailored to their needs.
    -----

    _______________________________

    VKThakur
    The Tejas has yet to mature and when it does the IAF will need to evaluate its performance against the alternatives available to it. I hope Tejas gets the nod from the IAF. But clearly the choice is for the Air Force to make
    ____________________________________

    This is the crux of the arguement. How will a system mature unless the IAF inducts it?

    Was the 21- Bis mature the moment it landed into IAF hands?

    The problem is that the IAF, like the Army has been used to "import as a matter of choice" methodology. The locals are kept happy by introducing a local lic manufacture package. Thats all very well but it does little for developing capabilities which the IAF will need one day. The way things are going among nations- what separates the men from the boys and the wannabes from the achievers, is technology. China knows this- hence it persists with the J-10 despite easily available Su27's and 30's which it can easily afford thanks to its economy. We wasted two and half decades inducting MiG21 variants, content in the realization that the SUnion would be around forever, then woke up to see spares supplies shot to hell and we have to send delegation after delegation to keep RAC MiG happy.

    Unless the IAF says- fine- we have to commit to the LCA as a national endeavour which will help *us* in the long run, nothings going to happen.

    We will continue to be reliant on France and Russia for fighters well into the end of the next century.

    And there will continue to be a horrendous Forex outflow. The design work and R&D work will remain the prerogative of the Dassault crew and the Sukhoi design establishment and we will continue to be license assemblers. Where we get technology, we will pay through our nose for it.

    In the future, young IITians, REC-ians etc have to look towards Bangalore, Hyderabad and Gurgaon as a mecca of technology. Not rush towards the US for a job, because aerospace is not "happening" in India or they'll be paid peanuts.

    Did you know that the US gets 9 BILLION $ a year, in free education? Thats right. Including all those Indians,etc who rush over, having been educated at the Indian taxpayers expense and then start working in the US, with little startup costs involved for the Americans!

    And these are the elite. All those boys who stuck gamely to their studies, proved themselves and will now be working on some DARPA project and for Raytheon and Lockheed Martin. What does that do for India, apart from some inches in the Times of India about NRI's striking it big? They'll drive innovation and we are exporting them. Paying for their education and sending them off. Why? Because we were unable to create a structure back home, that could harness their talents.

    The IAF has to involve itself with the LCA and *see it through*. This is *your future* we are talking about, since the IAF is an extension of India. Its not just national pride or more mundane but essential logistics issues, we are referring to but where we want to see India go.

    Whether that involves deputing people to GTRE, having QA specialists making sure production adheres to Quality norms, sitting on ADA's head for timely delivery- *so be it*. The IAF cannot divorce itself from the R&D side of things and say- give the buggers a long rope and let them hang themselves.

    We, as a nation, cannot take the easy way out, each time around. The Russians will love it. They will offer subsitutes at critical times. So will the French. Aatre when questioned about why GTRE could not just tie up with a foreign agency re: the Kaveri- remarked " they want to put their core in our engine". IOW, Russian/ French with a made in India sticker. Wheres the learning?

    Also, how can one expect the LCA to "mature", unless its the IAF which is part and parcel of the Maturement program.

    The F-16 had a torrid development history, problems galore- the USAF stuck it out and worked with it- ejection seat issues, engine flame outs, FBW stability problems, Wing design issues. A/C crashed, comments were made but the US stuck it out. And now its the doyen of Light fighters.

    And finally, as regards close combat- if the LCA achieves its Air Staff Requirements, and is equipped with its intended fit- a HMCS with the R73 able to take off boresigh shots, then it will be more than enough to deal with the FC1 and quite creditable against the F-16. Especially considering that the latter in PAF service are extremely unlikely to receive the JHMCS and the Aim-9X.

    It is these gamut of issues the LCA is intended for. Yes, the IAF has every right to ensure that the LCA must meet its standards and it should not be foisted upon them. But its contingent upon the IAF to be keenly involved in LCA development and not just watch the program as an observer. They have to be *stakeholders* and not merely *customers*.

    All the best.
    Venkatesh

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    A balanced article
    By NV on Saturday, January 29, 2005 (EST)
    This article appeared in Military Technology, and is written not by an Indian but an impartial commentator. The bit about criticism rings particularly true.

    India's "Radiance": ADA/HAL LCA TEJAS

    By Paul Dreger

    India has for a long time pursued the strategic objective to become at least partially independent from foreign sources for the procurement of weapon systems, that are considered as strategic. Within this long-term goal, the capability to design, develop and manufacture a state-of-the-art combat aircraft has been a recurring and firm reference point.





    The first attempt in this direction launched in the second half of the '50s, was the HAL HF-24 MARUT (“Wind Spirit”). The aircraft, designed by a team headed by the legendary Prof. Kurt Tank who had been responsible among others for the FW-190 and Ta-152 of WWII fame was only partially successful due to its inadequate performance. The MARUT had been intended as a potentially Mach-2 capable multi-role combat aircraft but because of the insufficient power of its licence-built Rolls-Royce ORPHEUS Mk703 engine it could actually only go supersonic in dives. Despite this a total of 147 MARUTs were built, and the type saw combat service in ground-attack roles during the war against Pakistan in 1971. The proposed HF-73 derivative was to use more powerful engines for full supersonic performance but the programme was cancelled after a crash leading to the decision to procure the JAGUAR. The last MARUT was finally withdrawn in 1985.


    In addition to the main LCA series production run for the Indian Air Force, the Indian Navy is expected to eventually procure some 40 naval derivative aircraft to equip its carriers.



    After this very limited success not to say partial failure more than twenty years elapsed before the launch of another fresh attempt. The idea for what eventually became the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) programme was formulated back in 1983 - a timeframe which also saw the start of other combat aircraft projects such as the US ATF (Advanced Tactical Fighter) which eventually resulted in the Lockheed Martin F/A-22 RAPTOR, the EUROFIGHTER or the RAFALE all of which have been plagued by interminable delays and cost overruns for the most disparate reasons.



    Programme Background

    It should be stressed that the LCA programme was since the very beginning aimed not only at the design and manufacture of new state-of-the-art combat aircraft per se! but more broadly at the establishment of an integrated scientific/industrial capability to develop and put in production a complete airborne weapon system in all its elements: airframe engine, avionics fire control system based on multi-mode radar electronic countermeasure suite on-board systems and components and so on. In other words the true final goal is to leverage on the LCA programme for the creation of a new technology base in India covering the whole spectrum of disciplines related to the design and manufacturing of combat aircraft.



    It is quite clear that such a very ambitious effort necessarily implies accepting substantial risks, particularly as regards the development schedule. Such risks however must be evaluated and assessed in view of the long-term goal as mentioned above, and not simply in relation to the timeframe for the development and operational deployment of the LCA. This point is apparently lost to many of those who criticise or even ridicule the LCA for being years behind schedule.



    The LCA project definition phase was launched in 1987 by ADA (Aeronautical Development Agency), with a first flight very optimistically planned for 1990 and entry into service five years later. Industrial activities are the responsibility of Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL).



    Needless to say, the original programme schedule quickly proved to be grossly unrealistic; indeed, the Full Scale Engineering Development (FSEO) Phase1 was launched in June 1993, this being financed by the government to the tune of Rs. 2,188 crore (1 crore = 10 million rupees). The first technology demons-trator, designated TDI (serial number KH2001), was actually rolled out on 17 November 1995. Here again innumerable delays, due to technical difficulties but also to political reasons contributed to the first flight being postponed until 4 January 2001. Several critical systems and components, including most notably the Fly-by-Wire flight control system (developed in collaboration with Lockheed Marlin) and the General Electric F404 engine (planned for the TD aircraft pending availability of the indigenous GTRE GTX-35VS KAVERI), are American imports and hence suffered from the embargo, enforced by the US Government in 1998 due to the Indian nuclear programme.





    The two LCA technology demonstrators in formation flight.

    The FSED Phase II started in November 2001 under an additional budget of Rs. 3,302 crore. The overall programme financing included not only the manufa-cture of two technology demonstrator aircraft, but also five prototypes (PV1 to PV5) and eight limited series production (LSP) planes.



    The second demonstrator (TD2, #KH2002) was rolled out in August 1998 and flew for the first time on 6 June 2002. The fight test programme has since progressed, although not at the pace sought and expected after such long delays, and by early January 2004 a total of 140 flights had been performed. An important achievement although perhaps more from the psychological rather than technical point of view, was the first supersonic flight by TDI on 1 August 2003, followed on 27 November by TD2 which reached Mach 1.1 on its 66th flight.



    After the two demonstrators, the development programme is to continue with five prototypes. PV1 was rolled out on 4 May 2003 and flew for the first time on 24 November and PV2 is expected to have also been completed by the times these lines appear in print. The prototypes are to be progressively more representative of the production aircraft with a lighter composite fuselage (-746kg), more and more capable flight control software (implementing variable gain control laws) aerial refueling probe and possibly the radar, to be installed in the PV2, PV3 and PV4. One PV aircraft is to be manufactured in a single-seat naval configuration and another as a two-seat, the remaining three being representative of the basic, Indian Air Force single-seat configuration.



    All the prototypes as well as most probably the whole first series production run of about 30-40 aircraft are now planned to be powered by the F404 engine, this being due to the development programme of the KAVERI being even more beyond schedule than the aircrafts. Indeed. General Electric is offering India a dedicated more powerful version of the F404 for the production TEJAS. Designated F404-GE-IN20, this offers 20,000lb thrust (9070kg, 89.1kN) with afterburning. The new version would use elements of the RM12 derivative of the F404, built by Volvo Flygmotor for the JAS 39 GRIPEN, as well as a FADEC similar to the system as used on the F414 engine which equips the F/A-18E/F Super HORNET. The proposed initial contract is rumoured to be for 35 engines, which would point to a batch of 30 aircraft plus spares.



    Three Main Versions

    The TEJAS (“Radiance'' or “Glorious'' in Sanskrit) as the LCA has been officially named, has been conceived to satisfy a number of different operational requirements for both the Indian Air Force and the Indian Navy. The basic single-seat IAF version will be a multi-role combat aircraft capable of performing air superiority missions as well as ground-attack and anti-ship roles. A still unspecified variety of guided and unguided weapons will supplement the 23mm twin-barrel GSh-23 cannon with 220 rounds, semi-recessed in a slightly protruding fairing under the starboard engine intake trunk.



    The planned dedicated carrier-borne variant will also be a single-seater but will feature a number of adaptations and changes including e.g. a new Landing gear with stronger legs and long-stroke shock absorbers tail hook and enhanced high-lift aerodynamic devices (retractable canard surfaces wing leading edge vortex controllers replacing the slat of the ground-based variants) to reduce approach speed and improve low speed controllability. The naval TEJAS will also have a lowered nose to enhance forward visibility during approach: and a retractable in-flight refueling probe replacing the fixed type. The maximum weapon load will be slightly reduced (from 4,000kg to 3,500kg) to partially compensate for the higher empty weight, while an additional weight reduction is planned to be obtained by further increasing the already large contents of composite material of the basic version which amount to 45% of the airframe by weight and 95% of its surface.



    The other member of the family will be a tandem two-seater for operational trainer roles at OCUs (Operational Conversion Units) the PV5 prototype being manufactured in this configuration. The aircraft will have aerodynamics commonality with the naval version. The attrition problems frequently encountered in the last years in the pilot training by the Indian Air Force makes it essential to introduce such a variant in adequate numbers.



    The Way Ahead

    Coming to the operational deployment of the TEJAS and while a certain caution is advisable in view of the many development problems that have been encountered so far current plan calls for IOC (Initial Operational Capability) to be hopefully achieved by 2007 in coincidence with enough aircraft having been delivered to equip half a squadron, with FOC (Full Operational Capability) following by 2009. It will probably be necessary to wait until 2010-2012 for the aircraft to attain its full multirole potential. Some independent Indian commentators have put forward much more pessimistic forecasts and they don't see series delivery starting before 2008 with IOC in around 2010 or even 2012.


    Be this as it may, as already indicated the current financing of the LCA programme includes a first batch of eight limited series production (LSP) aircraft, which were ordered in early June 2002. Given that the first prototype has just flown, the LSP order is mostly intended to allow HAL to prepare the necessary facilities. This first order is expected to be followed by a first series batch of some 30-40 aircraft.



    The Indian Air Force looks at the TEJAS programme as the direct replacement of its fleet of MiG-21s, while at the same time progressing from the specialised air-to-air roles of the small Russian fighter to multirole capabilities. This translates into a total requirement for 220 aircraft, including 20 two-seat conversion trainers.



    The TEJAS would thus complement the much larger Su-30MK1, with the two types coming to represent the bulk of the IAF combat line until the new fifth generation combat aircraft (currently designated PAKFA) to be developed in cooperation between Russia and India will enter service.



    The 220 TEJAS for the IAF should be supplemented by an additional 40 aircraft for the Indian Navy. In the first quarter of 2003 the Indian Government approved the relevant development programme to the tune of the equivalent of $210 million with clearance for carrier operation planned for 2007 and entry into service not later than in 2010. However, considerable uncertainties still seem to surround the programme. On the one hand, the real wisdom of developing a naval variant of the LCA in view of such a limited production run could be questioned. On the other hand and arguably more ominously, the Indian Navy is finally completing negotiations for the purchase and radical reconstruction of the moothballed Russian aircraft carrier ADMIRAL GORSHKOV in a package deal that includes, amongst other items at least 20 MiG-29K fighters. The Russians are reported to have reacted ''furiously'' to recent attempts by the Indian naval authorities at including non-Russian items (such as the Israeli BARAK SAM system) in the modernisation programme for the GORSHKOV, and they would most likely cancel the deal if the Indians were to refuse the MiG-29Ks. Suggestions have also been floated to the effect that the ex-GORSHKOV is to operate the MiG-29Ks while the future planned 37,000 tons Air Defence Ship (ADS) would receive the navalised TEJAS, but such a twin solution appears highly perplexing unless the ADS is postponed to a distant future.



    The Prime Minister of India, Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee with ADA and HAL managers, technicians and military personnel at the roll-out ceremony of the first LCA prototype (PV1).



    Mention has also been done, from time to time, of the TEJAS supposedly having good export prospects. Surely, if the aircraft will live up to its designers’ expectations, and if its selling price will be reasonable, then some export success is possible - if not for other reason then for the political advantages of not having to buy from either Russia or the West. The series production price ofthe TEJAS is currently projected at the equivalent of $17-20 million for the first batch, and efforts are being implemented to reduce this figure down to $15 million once production ramps up. Timing would seem to be a critical factor, however, in that China is also pushing ahead with the development of a similar combat aircraft and will most probably aim at the same export market.



    Technical Description

    Looking in some detail to the LCA design features, the effort by the designers to apply a variety of state-of-the-art technologies in order to achieve the required flight performance together with multirole operational capabilities in such a small airframe is evident. The TEJAS is in the same weight and size class as the JAS-39 GRIPEN, which however could capitalise on the superb experience Saab and its associated industries had matured in over 60 years of continuous combat aircraft design - and despite this suffered from not-so-negligible development problems with the loss of two prototype aircraft during flight tests. In fact the two aircraft are currently powered by variants of the same engine. It is however interesting to note that some of the most significant peculiarities of latest-generation Russian combat aircraft have found room on the TEJAS, including e.g. the IRST (Infrared Search and Track) sensor, the HMD/S (Helmet Mounted Display/sight) as well as 'TVC' (Thrust Vectoring Control) as a future pre-planned improvement.



    The aerodynamic configuration is based on a pure delta wing layout with shoulder-mounted wings. The forward wing-fuselage junctures cover the side-mounted fixed-geometry air intakes thus straightening the airflow entering the intakes even at high angle of attack (AoA) to obtain a smooth distortion-free airflow to the engine. The wing's outer leading edge incorporates a three-section slats while the inboard sections have additional slats to generate vortex lift over the inner wing and high-energy air-flow along the fin to enhance high AoA stability and prevent departure from controlled flight. The wing trailing edge is occupied by a two segment elevons to provide pitch and lateral control. Two airbrakes are located in the upper rear part of the fuselage to the side of the fin.



    The aircraft is naturally unstable, stability and control being provided by a full-authority quadruplex digital Fly-by-wire (FBWI flight control system).



    The structure of the TEJAS is mostly made in advanced materials, and even the metallic parts are aluminum-lithium and titanium alloys. The demonstrators have about 30% of the in structure by weight built by carbon composite and 57% by aluminum alloy these percentages shifting to 40% and 43% respectively in the prototypes and production aircraft. In particular, the wing upper and lower skin are single composite (CFRP Carbon Fiber Reinforced Plastic) elements bolted on the wing box whose spars and ribs are built of carbon composite (the same solution as adopted on the F/A-22). The same material is used for the elevons, fin and rudder, and airbrakes, while most of the fuselage skin is also made of composite as are the landing gear doors.



    The fuselage-mounted retractable landing gear uses single wheels on trailing arms for the main units and a twin-wheel for the nose unit. A brake parachute is located in the fairing under the rudder. The fuel is carried in integral fuselage and wing tanks, while a fixed in-flight refueling probe (retractable in the naval variant) is a standard fit. A significant increase in fuel capacity (actually superior to internal tankage) can be provided by three 1,200lt or up to five 800lt external tanks carried on the four inner store stations and the under fuselage one.



    There are a total of seven hard points (three under each wing and one under the fuselage), with the four inner pylons and the central one being “wet”. A Stores Management System (SMS) with 32 bit single-chip micro-controller based dual-redundant architecture and MIL-STD-1553B armament bus for intra-system communication and weapon interface will provide integrated control of air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons. The range of these weapons does not appear having been defined yet, or at least no information have been released.



    The TEJAS avionics architecture is configured around MIL-STD-1553B data buses with built-in redundancy. The Mission Data Processor's design follows Open Architecture Computing (OAC) criteria which overcome hardware obsolescence and enable software reusability. Commercial Off-The-shelf (COTS) components duly tested to military standards have been extensively used. The Digital Flight Control Computer (DFCC) takes inputs from the pilot inertial platform and air data sensors and generates appropriate commands to the control surfaces (rudder elevons slats and air brakes) actuators for effecting necessary deflections for aircraft maneuvers as per pilot's demand. The Flight Control System software has been developed using Ada language and follows DOD standards. An Independent Verification & Validation (IV&V) process ensures correctness, consistency, completeness and adherence to MIL standards of all safety-critical onboard software.



    As already indicated, in addition to the basic airframe and the KAVERI engine, the LCA programme also envisages an ambitious development effort for several systems and equipment. One of the most significant such items is a multimode radar offering all the modes that are nowadays expected by such a state-of-the-art system including track-while-scan for the simultaneous engagement of multiple aerial targets Doppler beam sharpening, moving target indicator, ground mapping, and more. The antenna will be a light-weight, low-profile slotted waveguide array with a multilayer feed network for broadband operation. This radar being developed by the ERDE (Electronic Research and Development Establishment) in cooperation with HAL has however run into major delays and cost escalations. It is thus not totally inconceivable that in order to avoid adding further uncertainties to the LCA programme as whole a foreign solution could be adopted for at least the initial TEJAS production batch.

    (I'll chip in here to add that the MMR is now said to be on track. It has been integrated onto a LCA and tests are ongoing)

    Mention has been made of French types (such as the RDY already installed in the IAF's MIRAGE 2000s), Russian and Israeli models and perhaps even the Italian FIAR GRIFO which however could be at a disadvantage due to it being in service on Pakistani aircraft.





    GRTE KAVERI



    As already commented, the real long-term goal of the LCA programme is to establish the required industrial capabilities to design and produce all the main components of a combat aircraft. It is thus logical that the power plant should be regarded as one of the critical elements in the overall LCA effort.



    Responsible for the design and development of the KAVERI engine is the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE). GTRE was created back in 1959, and its activities have since progressed through a number of medium-thrust experimental engines starting with the GTX-37-14U afterburning turbojet, the GTX37-14UB low bypass turbofan derivative and finally the GTX-35VS turbofan, the forerunner of the KAVERI.





    The actual launch of the programme for the KAVERI dates back to 1986, just before that of the LCA. The first bench run of the core engine was performed in early 1995 with the initial test of the complete engine following in September. A total of 17 development engines have been planned to contribute to the development programme, which however has suffered from significant delays. Some help has been obtained from Russia in the form of additional tests being conducted at the well-equipped Russian test centres in particular high-altitude chamber tests, which should account for at least 1,000 hours out of the estimated total of 8,000 test hours deemed necessary to complete the engine development. A subsequent evaluation campaign, announced but not yet started, foresees initial actual flight tests being carried out with an engine mounted in a pod under a Tu-16. It is however clear that the engine's development schedule is out of synch with the LCA programme, hence the decision to equip at ;least the initial production batch of TEJAS with an improved version of the General Electric F404-GE-F2J3 which already powers the demonstrators and the pre-production aircraft.



    One peculiar design target of the KAVERI has been to tailor it to the specific local operating conditions in particular the high ambient temperature' which have given way to the flat rating of thrust to be maintained up to ISA +20OC external temperature condition. The KAVERI is a two-shaft low by-pass ratio (about 0.4) turbofan with afterburner with a mass flow of 78kg/s. The low pressure rotor is based on a three-stage fan/low pressure compressor, designed to produce a 3.4:1 pressure ratio and driven by a single-stage turbine with cooled blades. The high pressure core uses a six-stage compressor, with variable inlet guide vanes on the first two stator vanes, designed to generate a 6.4:1 compression ratio. It is also driven by a single-stage turbine with cooled blades built using directional solidified technology. The engine's overall design pressure ratio of 21.5:1 (by comparison the conceptual similar F404 and EJ200 reach a value of 26:1) is still a target, the actual value reached so far being less than 20:1. The annular combustion chamber uses air-blast fuel atomisers while the high-pressure turbine inlet temperature is 1,700K. The afterburner is fully modulable and ends with a convergent-divergent Variable nozzle which should in the future give way to a multi-axis thrust-vectoring unit to enhance aircraft's maneuverability. Finally the engine Control is via a FADEC (Full Authority Digital Engine Control) developed by GTRE itself in collaboration with HAL.



    The engine current Weight is in the range of 1,150kg, the target for the production Version being 950kg, i.e. about 100kg lower than the F404. The maximum sea level static thrust flat rated to ISA+20-C condition is 52/81kN (5,300/8,260kg), respectively in dry/afterburning regime, with a related specific fuel consumption of 22.1/57.5 mg/Ns (0.78/2.03 kg/h/kgst).


    Sourced from Military Technology

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    Seriously, U were in the IAF and not the PAF?
    By DrShankar on Thursday, July 28, 2005 (EST)
    Sir, with all due respect it is people like u who prevent India from going forward. No wonder some people are enthusiastic when the US says it is "going to make India a superpower"

    Firstly, get that damn tagline of urs fixed. We spend 3% of our budget on military affairs as compared to 8% of the US, 6% of Pukistan and 10-15% of China.

    Secondly, Marut was never a failure. It was an underperformer not because of the design but the inability to get suitable engines from the British. Marut was a reliable aircraft. 3 times it returned with only one engine. 1 Marut has been lost in air to air combat. Pray tell me how does that compare to the uberfighter that the F-104 Sabrefighter was supposed to be? Give respect for what was due, it was a plane that did not promise a lot but delivered on what was promised. Tell me u knew that, u flew it didnt u?

    The LCA program has been well defended, there is no reason to explain it more. It too is no uberfighter but is merely a cheap, effective second tier aircraft. It will be deployed in numbers which will bring out its effectiveness.
    126 MRCA Mirage2000 will not necessarily mean we dont need the LCA.

    P.S Objectivity is to be appretiated, u definitely have an agenda. What i would not like to speculate? Patriotism may be ur flogging horse but please the facts on our side.

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    LCA - Tejas
    By gharik on Sunday, September 25, 2005 (EST)
    It is a known fact that the Tejas program right from its inception is a flawed exercise. However, as rightly pointed out my many of the respondents several other countries have faced innumerable bottlenecks in developing an advanced fighter jet. The delay in the Tejas program is quite acceptable given India's poor industrial infrastructure and also its historical inexperience in developing high tech planes. However, complacency, bureaucracy, lethargy, political interference and its like should be appropriately addressed. The ideal tactic to counter this lacuna is to privatize the entire effort. This would bring in preset efficiencies and economies of scale which is the hallmark of any private enterprise. If our government cannot provide us with our most basic needs do you believe that they would provide us an adequate defense system? Mull it over.

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    LCA
    By Red on Saturday, October 29, 2005 (EST)
    We all are here to put our point of views, so we should refrain being childish and pointing fingers. I see both point of views here and they both are valid to a certain extent. It gives a lot of pleasure to see that LCA (and other technology demonstrators) is being built and our country is progressing towards self-sufficiency, but it also makes me proud to see our Defense Forces fight they way they do. We in India don’t have luxury to take our time to build stuff, we have real enemies and real wars to fight. Our forces don’t go in war when the opposition has been decimated and all that shoots at them is a world war –II relic rifles.
    Organizations like the DRDO have some kind of lethargy about them; there is a lot of wastage of time, money, material and effort. These organizations should have a more professional feel about them and pull there sock up in general, to provide our forces equipment worth fighting with. I know every organization has some good people and some bad ones, but the black sheep are growing in number….

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    Tejas Could Be Good - JustStop Trying To Do Everything Locally
    By Joe Katzman on Tuesday, December 13, 2005 (EST)
    Let's stay clear on what the Tejas is meant to be - an inexpensive lightweight fighter that fills the MiG-21 role, can carry advanced air-air missiles, and adds some multirole capability. If it's almost as good as a Mirage 2000 but costs 20% less, it will be a home run (in cricket, a 6).

    Looking at the design, planned weight, etc., there's no reason the Tejas can't meet this test with flying colours. The only thing holding it back is India's tendency to insist on local components for everything.

    That's slow, expensive, and risky. The Chinese are doing much better in their weapons programs than India precisely because they're NOT fixated on local components. Not yet, anyway.

    India could have the Tejas done, tested, and in service inside of 2 years if it took what it had, then used foreign components to replace every part of the plane currently slowing it down.

    * Engine: why create a new engine, then go through all of the teething problems they all have, for a small purchase order of fighters? That's dumb. The JAS-39 Gripen is very happy going with the proven F404, and it's a great 4th generation plane. Stick with the GE F404 engine, or if you must move up to the F414 used on the Super Hornet.

    * Avionics & Computing: India can do well here, but anything not in good shape yet should be replaced by proven Israeli systems. They make great stuff, and have worked well with India on past projects.

    * Multi-Mode Radar: Lots of choices from the Europeans, Israelis, and Russians even if you don't want to pick an American radar. Do a deal that involves local manufacture with some tech transfer, and settle for moving the industry forward.

    Etc. The bottom line is that the only reasons the Tejas is not yet a successful, operational fighter are political. change those things holding the program back, and watch India get stronger on defense and also stronger over the long term at producing its own material.

    Engineers and project managers need the experience of working on winning teams, not endless projects that fail or are considered questionable when they finally reach service.

    Look at the BrahMos missile as an excellent "winning team" example and model....

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    AESA as ground systems ?
    By harishkumar09 on Tuesday, June 06, 2006 (EST)
    Can you give me the link which says india has developed aesa as a ground based system ?

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    The mistake we made
    By harishkumar09 on Thursday, June 08, 2006 (EST)
    We should have asked the DRDO to concentrate in one area in which we Indians are generally strong and good at , like electronics , sonars and software , and mated all latest electrnics from israel into Russian hardware.

    Plus we should have asked the DRDO to make simple and useful weapons , for example a subsonic strike air craft to do the Close Air Support roles.Its a simple challenge on which DRDO would have delivered and the defence forces would have immenseley beenfitted from it.While we continue to import and integrate top of the line aircraft.

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    Hi Joe
    By NV on Thursday, October 05, 2006 (EST)
    If I may :-)

    ------------------------------

    Joe said:

    India could have the Tejas done, tested, and in service inside of 2 years if it took what it had, then used foreign components to replace every part of the plane currently slowing it down.
    -----------------------------

    Yes, but then we are back to system design, and reliance on a plethora of international vendors, which is something the LCA was meant to overcome by developing a local aerospace industry. What you are proposing is the AIDC Ching Kuo/ Korean F-50/ model. The LCA is much more ambitious & I daresay essential for India, since its to be the lynchpin of an Indian aerospace industry.

    _____________________________________________
    Joe said:

    Engine: why create a new engine, then go through all of the teething problems they all have, for a small purchase order of fighters? That's dumb. The JAS-39 Gripen is very happy going with the proven F404, and it's a great 4th generation plane. Stick with the GE F404 engine, or if you must move up to the F414 used on the Super Hornet.
    ______________________________________________

    The Kaveri is not just meant for the LCA. The Kaveri marine version is meant for Naval ships, propulsion engineers from the Navy are already working on the project. Its requirements are easier than the AF fighter production unit, and the program has gone along smoother. For the AF, the Kaveri is to be used for different AF aircraft, including the MCA. The same design is also to be used for powering a variety of ground power equipment for power stations given Indias demand for ever increasing electricity supplies!
    All in all, the engine has a market for it, once ready.

    The Ge 404, well the USs past history of imposing sanctions has impacted negatively on the IAF perception of relying on it for the long term..
    __________________________________________

    Joe said:

    * Avionics & Computing: India can do well here, but anything not in good shape yet should be replaced by proven Israeli systems. They make great stuff, and have worked well with India on past projects.
    ___________________________________________

    I agree, but a caveat. A balance has to be struck between continuing local development and purchasing from abroad. Many a times, units may end having to be specifically developed for the LCA, boosting cost and development timelines.
    India in fact is doing as you suggest and codeveloping the critical EW suite with Israel plus will probably do the same for datalinks. The rest of the items are ready and are in fact being integrated on other IAF planes as mid life updates/ upgrades.


    ___________________________________________

    Joe said:

    * Multi-Mode Radar: Lots of choices from the Europeans, Israelis, and Russians even if you don't want to pick an American radar. Do a deal that involves local manufacture with some tech transfer, and settle for moving the industry forward.
    ____________________________________________

    Agree but the MMR needs to be developed fully. License production will not give India the ability to design and manufacture a modern FCR on its own.

    ______________________________________
    Joe said:

    Etc. The bottom line is that the only reasons the Tejas is not yet a successful, operational fighter are political. change those things holding the program back, and watch India get stronger on defense and also stronger over the long term at producing its own material.
    _________________________________________

    Agreed, but the Tejas program has a lot riding on its shoulders & hence the burden.


    ____________________________________________
    Joe said:

    Engineers and project managers need the experience of working on winning teams, not endless projects that fail or are considered questionable when they finally reach service.
    ____________________________________________

    True, but the LCA will not be that- please see the IAF contribution at present, its pulling out its A-Line pilots and test crew and deputing them to the project. The delays have generated bad press to be sure, but the product will match the IAFs specs given how deeply they are involved at present.

    ______________________________________________
    Joe said:

    Look at the BrahMos missile as an excellent "winning team" example and model....
    _______________________________________________

    Agreed, but the LCA has had far more local design & development & participation, the kind that will allow India to design its own aircraft from the ground up or have it make substantial contribution to a codevelopment program.

    Cheers!

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    I hate people who do copy paste..grrrr
    By pravinutankar on Tuesday, October 17, 2006 (EST)
    I said it before and i say it now, it is all about money(affordability).
    LCA with thrust vectoring(Russia is helping)
    and advance radar(Israle and India have joint developed ) will make LCA a 4.5generation plane.
    I just wished if it would go Mac-3+(with playload)

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    LCA Induction
    By sam1980 on Thursday, October 19, 2006 (EST)
    It seems like same story as that of Arjun MBT, Trishul,Akash,Nag and other DRDO stuffs that are were never inducted.

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    Affordability---?
    By vineetbhanot on Thursday, October 26, 2006 (EST)
    Everybody knowns that what indians are made of and what they can do. At the same time we all know that in this country everything is too expensive for our democratic govt.