The Indo-US Joint statement issued after the delegation-level meeting between the Prime Minister , Dr. Manmohan Singh and the US President Mr. George W. Bush, in Washington DC on July 18, 2005 has been largely welcomed in India and abroad.
However, some security concerns have been voiced. At least two of them need to be debated and discussed. They are
- The agreement will limit our access to fissile material and possibly compromise our ability to maintain a credible nuclear deterrence.
- India has agreed to extend and maintain its moratorium on nuclear testing.
Both the concerns listed above are serious. However, are they serious enough to label the agreement as a sellout of our long term security concerns for short term security gains?
Availability of Fissile Material
In the agreement with the US India has consented to identify and separate civilian and military nuclear facilities and programs in a phased manner and file a declaration regarding its civilians facilities with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It will also voluntarily place its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards and sign and adhere to an Additional Protocol with respect to civilian nuclear facilities.
The concern here is that once a nuclear facility is identified by India as civilian it will be placed under IAEA safeguards. This will eventually restrict the amount of fissile material available for weaponization.
Our nuclear doctrine is based on maintaining a Credible Nuclear Deterrence. The posture gives us the flexibility to increase the number of our nuclear warheads to match any perceived increase in threat. The intent of the Doctrine is to maintain deterrence without tying ourselves down to any numbers in so far as nuclear warheads go.
Following the agreement the number of warheads that we choose to deploy would be governed not just by our threat perception but also by the amount of unsafeguarded fissile material available to us. Theoretically this does compromise our deterrence. Practically, it depends on the stockpile of unsafeguarded fissile material currently available with us and as also with our nuclear adversaries.
In view of the fact that India is capable of indigenously developing nuclear power plants, including fast breeder reactors, and the prerogative of classifying a nuclear facility as civil or military rests with India there appears to be no serious security concern here.
Moratorium on Nuclear Testing
The more serous concern is perhaps in India’s commitment to continue its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. In view of the fact that there exists credible evidence that our nuclear weapon tests of 1998 failed to validate some of our warhead designs the moratorium on nuclear testing has already compromised the credibility of our minimum deterrence. Continuing that moratorium ensures that India is doomed to be relegated to the twilight zone as far as its status as a nuclear power. is concerned.
In this context it is relevant to note that in another part of the agreement India has agreed to reciprocally assume the same responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology, such as the United States. This part of the agreement could be interpreted such that were India to resume nuclear weapon testing following a resumption of testing by Pakistan India could be held in violation of the agreement because Pakistan is not a leading country with advanced nuclear technology! Perhaps we shot ourselves in our foot here.
A resumption of nuclear weapon testing by Pakistan may appear far fetched today with Musharaf at the helm. However, it could quickly become a stark reality if a radical Islamist regime were to seize control. How would India respond then?
India’s endeavor to acquire respectability by hyphentating itself with leading countries with advanced nuclear technologyy has its pitfalls. The problem is that the leading countries with advanced nuclear technology have tested their nuclear warheads to perfection. India has not.
Conclusion
There can be little doubt that there are legitimate long term security concerns in the wording of the recently concluded agreement with the US. In the short term, however, we are pretty well off.
Whether the perceived lapses constitute a sell out or not is moot. A lot will depend on how skillfully India conducts its diplomacy in the future.
The moratorium on nuclear testing is the more serious concern. Fortunately the use of the word unilateral in the continue its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing is a possible escape clause. It could be argued that by unilaterally agreeing to do something we do not become treaty bound to do it. There is also the likelihood that the US itself will resume nuclear testing in order to maintain its deterrence and thus give India another possible escape clause.